University of Michigan Law School

University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository
Articles

Faculty Scholarship

2016

Full circle? The Single Tax Principle, BEPS, and the
New US Model
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah
University of Michigan Law School, aviyonah@umich.edu

Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles/1820

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, Taxation-Federal Commons, TaxationTransnational Commons, and the Tax Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Avi-Yonah, Reuven S. "Full Circle? The Single Tax Principle, BEPS." Global Tax'n 1, pt. 1 (2016): 12-22.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

BEPS |

Reuven S. Avi-Yonah

Full Circle?
The Single Tax Principle, BEPS,
and The New US Model
1. Introduction
On October 5, 2015, the OECD and G20 released the final BEPS package. It
included the following new preamble to the OECD model tax treaty:
(State A) and (State B)…Intending to conclude a Convention for the elimination
of double taxation with respect to taxes on income and on capital without
creating opportunities for non-taxation or reduced taxation through tax
evasion or avoidance…(emphasis added)
This language embodies the OECD and G20’s official commitment to preventing
both double taxation and double non-taxation, i.e., to the single tax principle.
The official press release that accompanied the final package quoted OECD
Secretary General Angel Gurria as stating that “[t]he measures we are presenting
today represent the most fundamental changes to international tax rules in almost
a century”. How innovative is the final BEPS package?
This paper will argue that while there is some innovation in BEPS, it is in fact more
of a continuation that a sharp break with the past. Like Alexis de Tocqueville’s
French Revolution, BEPS represents both continuity and change.1 In particular, the
single tax principle has formed the theoretical basis of much of the international
tax regime from the beginning. And it is in fact this continuity rather than any
sharp change that gives the final BEPS package its promise to, as Secretary General
Gurria also promised, “put an end to double non-taxation.”

2. The Single Tax Principle
Since 1997, I have argued that a coherent international tax regime exists that is
embodied in both tax treaties and the domestic laws of most countries, including
the United States, and that limits the practical ability of countries to adopt any
international tax rules they choose. I further argued that the core of the international
tax regime is two principles, which I call the benefits principle (active income
should be taxed primarily at source and passive income primarily at residence) and
the single tax principle (all income should be subject to tax once at the rate derived
* Irwin I. Cohn Professor of Law, the University of Michigan.
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from the benefits principle, i.e., active income at the
consensus corporate rate and passive income at the
residence rate for individuals).2
This formulation has been highly controversial.
While most commentators would agree that
the benefits principle has been the core of the
international tax regime since 1923, many deny the
validity of the single tax principle and some doubt
its coherence.3 In particular, the single tax principle
suggests that whenever the country that has primary
jurisdiction under the benefits principle refrains
from taxing cross-border income, the other country
(residence for active income, source for passive)
should tax it instead. This seemed to fly in the face
of observed reality because residence countries
typically exempt or defer active income, and source
countries refrain from taxing many forms of passive
income unilaterally without regard to whether it is
taxed at residence.
There are, however, elements of US international
tax that seem consistent with the single tax
principle. The decision in 1918 to prevent double
taxation by granting a foreign tax credit rather than
an exemption was justified by Thomas Adams in
terms of the single tax principle.4 The adoption of
the foreign passive holding company rule in 1935,
followed by the PFIC rule in 1986, seems intended
to ensure effective residence based taxation of
passive income that is unlikely to be taxed at source.
The adoption of Subpart F in 1962 was premised
on the assumption that the type of income that can
be deferred (active income) is likely to be taxed at
source at rates comparable to the US rate, and that
other types of income (passive and base company
income) for which this assumption does not hold
should be taxed on a residence basis regardless of
the benefits principle (since some of them, especially
base company income, are active income that should
generally be taxed primarily at source).5
These examples all relate to the US as a residence
country. As a source country the first U.S. income
tax treaty was concluded with France in 1932, and it
reduced U.S. withholding taxes (e.g., on royalties to
zero) at a time when France was purely territorial,
i.e., did not tax foreign source income. Thus, at
approximately the same time that the U.S. was
enacting the foreign personal holding corporation
provisions to ensure that its residents pay tax on
income that was unlikely to be taxed at source, it
was tolerating double non-taxation of U.S. source
income earned by non-residents. The same tolerance

applied to U.S. tax treaties, which were commonly
extended to tax havens.
This began to change in the 1960s under the guidance
of Stanley Surrey, the author of Subpart F and a
major architect of the international tax regime.6
The first U.S. treaty that indicated that double nontaxation of U.S. source income was inappropriate
was the treaty with Luxembourg, which precluded
the application of reduced U.S. withholding rates to
certain Luxembourgian holding corporations that
were not subject to tax on a residence basis.7 Similar
language appears in the 1963 protocol to the Antilles
Treaty, in the 1970 U.S. treaty with Finland and the
1975 U.S. treaty with Iceland.8 The U.K. treaty of
1975 imposed limitations on the benefits of corporate
residents if the tax imposed by the residence country
was “substantially less” than the general corporate
tax and twenty-five percent or more of the company
was held by third-country residents.9 However, the
limitation did not apply to U.K. close companies
or to companies held by U.K. individuals, giving
rise to Rosenbloom’s comment that “it is difficult to
discern a coherent U.K. treaty policy in the article.”10
The 1978 protocol to the treaty with France likewise
contained only narrow limitations.
In general, therefore, U.S. policy before 1979 did not
significantly restrict double non-taxation in regard
to U.S. source income, despite placing significant
unilateral limits on double non-taxation when
the United States was the country of residence.
However, in 1979, following congressional
hearings that revealed the extensive use of the
Antilles Treaty by third-country residents, the U.S.
Treasury announced its intention to reexamine the
Antilles Treaty and a series of treaty extensions to
U.K. colonies and former colonies. In 1981, the
U.S. Treasury published the new U.S. Model Tax
Treaty, which for the first time included a broad
LOB provision applicable to both corporations
and individuals.11 This provision provided that the
benefits of reduced withholding under the treaty
will not apply to nonpublicly-traded corporations
residing in the treaty partner, unless over seventyfive percent of such corporations are owned by
individual residents and their income is not paid
out to residents of third countries. Additionally,
the LOB provided that treaty benefits will not be
available to corporations entitled to a significantly
lower tax rate in their country of residence.12
Subsequent to the 1981 U.S. Model Tax Treaty,
the LOB provision became a standard part of all
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U.S. treaties. It was next included in the treaties
with Cyprus (1981), Jamaica (1981), New Zealand
(1982), Australia (1982), Denmark (1983), France
(1983)—and every U.S. treaty since. Indeed, ever
since the Senate in 1981 refused to ratify the treaty
with Argentina unless it included a LOB, it has been
clear that no U.S. treaty will be ratified without
a LOB. And in 1986, Congress created a treaty
override by adopting a “qualified resident” test (a
simple LOB) in the context of the branch profits
tax, which made it applicable to all U.S. treaties,
including the majority that did not yet have an LOB
provision.13
Some argue that the creation of the LOB provision
had nothing to do with double taxation, but was
meant to prevent the United States from having a
“treaty with the world.” (i.e., allowing any nonresident to achieve treaty benefits without residing
in a treaty jurisdiction) by restricting treaty benefits
to residents of that state and not allowing the
extension of benefits to residents of other states,
regardless of whether they were subject to tax at
the residence. This, it can be argued, was also the
purpose of the termination of the treaties with the
Antilles and other tax havens in 1987.14
But, this limited view of the purpose of the LOB
provision is inconsistent with the last paragraph
of the 1981 model LOB, which explicitly makes
the reduction of source-based taxation contingent
on taxation at residence without regard to the
ownership of the recipient of the income. It is also
inconsistent with the contemporaneous views held
by Rosenbloom who, as International Tax Counsel
from 1977 to 1981, was responsible for the inclusion
of the LOB provision in the 1981 U.S. Model Tax
Treaty and other treaties of that period. In an article
published in 1983, Rosenbloom explained the policy
behind the LOB provision:
Many commentators believe that existing
international commerce is, to a considerable
extent, structured on the assumption that
liberal use of treaties will be tolerated. . .
.The fundamental goal of tax treaties is
removal of the negative effects of double
taxation…Since treaties are intended to
eliminate double taxation, their benefits
should flow to persons who, in the absence
of the treaty, might be subject to double
taxation. These are persons who, while
potentially subject to tax in one country
on either a source or a personal basis, are
also subject to tax in the other country on
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a personal basis. A principal task of treaty
drafters, then, should be to identify those
persons in each country who are subject to
that country’s personal taxing jurisdiction.
. . . It may prove necessary in some cases to
adopt special rules to ensure that taxation on
a personal basis is not avoided altogether.15
While Rosenbloom later mentioned the “treaty
with the world” problem and the revenue impact
of allowing third-country investors to benefit from
a treaty, the principal thrust of these observations
is that the United States (as a source jurisdiction)
should not reduce its withholding tax, unless it has
some reasonable assurance that the income will be
subject to tax on a residence basis.16
By 1981, the single tax principle had become a
foundation block of U.S. international tax policy. As
Rosenbloom stated, “One possible course would be
for Country X not to enter into a treaty relationship
unless it is satisfied that State Y will be likely to
impose a full tax on all persons falling within the
personal jurisdiction of State Y. In theory, then, at
least a single, substantial tax will be collected.”17
In 1984, the US adopted the dual consolidated loss
rule, which (as Rosenbloom acknowledged in his
later critique of the single tax principle) was the
high point of commitment because it incorporated
the principle into domestic US law.18
However, subsequent developments have led to
significant erosion in the US commitment to the
single tax principle. This began in 1984 with the
adoption of the portfolio interest exemption, which
relieves US source interest from taxation at source
without regard to whether it was taxed at residence.
The portfolio interest exemption has been followed
by the rest of the world because no country can
afford to tax interest if the largest economy does not
do so.19
The decline in the US commitment to the single
tax principle continued with a series of enactment
that created new exceptions to Subpart F: The
repeal of section 956A (1994), the banking and
insurance exceptions (1997), and the adoption of
check the box (1997). The broad use of check the
box to change pre-existing international tax rules
like Subpart F was unintended, and was followed
immediately by Notice 98-11 that represented an
attempt to undo the damage, but the genie was out
of the bottle: Congress blocked the Notice from
going into effect and subsequently enacted section
954(c)(6) to codify the harmful international effect
of check the box. The effect of these provisions was
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to enable US-based multinationals to defer tax on
the Subpart F (passive and base company) income
of their CFCs without triggering deemed dividends,
resulting in a massive $2.1 trillion that are currently
“trapped” in CFCs located in low tax jurisdictions
and that cannot be repatriated because of the 35%
tax on actual dividends.
Nevertheless,
despite
these
unfortunate
developments, in other areas the US did maintain its
commitment to the single tax principle. This can be
seen especially in the treaty context by the insistence
on LOB rules, by the conduit financing regulations
under Code 7701(l), and by the enactment of antiarbitrage provisions like Code 894(c). Even outside
the treaty context the IRS challenged a variety of
tax arbitrage schemes that result in double nontaxation, like the STARS transactions and other
“foreign tax credit generators.” And Congress
enacted sections 871(m) (to crack down on the use
of derivatives to avoid withholding on dividends)
and 901(k) and 7701(o)(2) (to address foreign tax
credit tax arbitrage transactions, like the Compaq
transaction). It can therefore be argued that the
fundamental commitment of the US to the single
tax principle remained unchanged despite the
portfolio interest exemption and “check the box.”
The financial crisis of 2008 and the UBS scandal led
to increased US concern about both tax evasion (US
citizens pretending to be foreigners and abusing the
portfolio interest exemption) and tax avoidance (the
increased attention to what Ed Kleinbard has dubbed
“stateless income” and the realization that “base
erosion and profit shifting” (BEPS) does not just
harm other countries but the US as well).20 The result
has been an increased commitment to the single tax
principle in both the US and overseas. This can be
seen in FATCA and its progeny, in the G20/OECD
BEPS project, and in the new US model treaty.

then share it under treaties. That, in turn, led to the
development of standard information exchange
rules that culminated in the Multilateral Agreement
on Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters
(MAATM), which has now been signed by over 80
countries (including the US) and which provides for
automatic exchange of information with no bank
secrecy or dual criminality exceptions. At the same
time, the US has now finalized regulations first
proposed in 2000 to require US financial institutions
to collect data on payments that qualify for the
portfolio interest exemption.
These developments promise to deal a significant blow
to tax evasion and consequent double non-taxation. In
fact, Gabriel Zucman has recently estimated that total
global tax evasion is only $200 billion annually, which
may seem like a big number but is actually very small in
comparison to overall financial income.21 His estimate
of US tax evasion and avoidance is only $36 billion,
which is much smaller than some previous estimates
(e.g., a commonly used number of $100 billion which
conflates tax evasion and avoidance, or my 2005
estimate of $50 billion for tax evasion).22 It may be
that Zucman is under-estimating, but it is also possible
that the deterrence effect of FATCA and MAATM has
worked and that the scope of the problem is indeed
smaller now than it was before 2010.
In any case, these developments indicate a global
commitment to enforce taxation of passive income
at residence and to limit the scope of the portfolio
interest exemption by subjecting payments to
potential automatic exchange of information.
It should be remembered that even the original
portfolio interest exemption has a provision (Code
871(h)(6)) that authorizes the Treasury to suspend
the exemption for countries that do not cooperate
with exchange of information. This provision has
much more bite in the age of MAATM.

3. FATCA and MAATM

4. BEPS

FATCA was initially adopted in 2010 in response
to the UBS case, and on the face of it FATCA is
just about requiring foreign financial institutions
to report accounts controlled by US citizens or
residents directly to the IRS. Because FATCA has
real teeth (non-complying FFIs that derive US
source income are subject to 30% withholding) and
because it violates local privacy laws, it initially met
with huge resistance. But the US Treasury was able
to negotiate Intergovernmental Agreements with
over 100 countries to permit FFIs to transfer the
information to their own governments, which would

“Base erosion and profit shifting affects all countries,
not only economically, but also as a matter of trust.
BEPS is depriving countries of precious resources
to jump-start growth, tackle the effects of the
global economic crisis and create more and better
opportunities for all. But beyond this, BEPS has been
also eroding the trust of citizens in the fairness of tax
systems worldwide. The measures we are presenting
today represent the most fundamental changes to

In introducing the final BEPS package on October 5,
2015, OECD Secretary General Angel Gurria stated
that:
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international tax rules in almost a century: they will
put an end to double non-taxation, facilitate a better
alignment of taxation with economic activity and
value creation, and when fully implemented, these
measures will render BEPS-inspired tax planning
structures ineffective”.23
While this is no doubt over optimistic, there is no
questioning the new found resolve of the G20 and
OECD to uphold the single tax principle. This goal
can be seen in all of the BEPS action steps:
Action 1: Addressing the Tax Challenges
of the Digital Economy
This step is designed to address the ability
of multinationals to avoid taxation of active
income at source by selling goods and
services into an economy without having
a PE. In a world in which most residence
jurisdictions exempt or defer taxation of
active income changing the PE physical
presence standard is essential to prevent
double non-taxation.
Action 2: Neutralising the Effects of
Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements
This step is obviously designed to address
double non-taxation by limiting tax
arbitrage transactions designed to utilize
hybrid mismatches to create double nontaxation. Check the box is a target.
Action 3: Designing Effective Controlled
Foreign Company Rules

Action 6: Preventing the Granting of Treaty
Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances
This action adopts the US LOB position
that treaty benefits should not result in
reduction of tax at source unless there is
effective taxation at residence, including
a “main purpose test” that states that the
purpose of treaties is to prevent both double
taxation and double non-taxation.
Action 7: Preventing the Artificial Avoidance
of Permanent Establishment Status
This action reinforces source based taxation
of active income and prevents the Shifting of
such income into low tax jurisdictions through
commissionaire and similar arrangements.
Actions 8-10: Aligning Transfer Pricing
Outcomes with Value Creation
These actions build on earlier OECD work
by limiting the ability to shift income to low
tax jurisdictions by transfer pricing.
Action 11: Measuring and Monitoring BEPS
This action attempts to incentivize
governments to act on BEPS by measuring
its Magnitude (between $100 and $240
billion reach year in tax avoided).

This step is intended to enforce effective
residence-based taxation of income that is
not taxed at source by limiting the scope of
exemption and deferral to income that is
subject to source based taxation.

Action 12: Mandatory Disclosure Rules

Action 4: Limiting Base Erosion Involving
Interest Deductions and Other Financial
Payments

Action 13: Guidance on Transfer Pricing
Documentation and Country-by-Country
Reporting

This step is designed to enforce source
based taxation of active income by
limiting interest and related deductions
that erode the corporate tax base without
corresponding inclusions at residence.

This action seems to bolster transfer pricing
by requiring country by country reporting
by multinationals, so that tax avoidance can
be measured and source taxation of active
income upheld.

Action 5: Countering Harmful Tax
Practices More Effectively, Taking into
Account Transparency and Substance

Action 14: Making Dispute Resolution
Mechanisms More Effective

This step is intended to reinforce source
based taxation of active income by putting
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limits on harmful tax competition involving
special regimes like patent boxes and
cashboxes, and by requiring real investment
that raises the transaction costs.
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This action seeks to prevent secret rulings
that enable multinationals to pay very low
effective tax rate in countries that appear to
have high corporate tax rates.

This action builds on previous OECD work
on mandatory arbitration in tax treaties to
prevent double taxation. It is a necessary
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corollary to the steps that limit double nontaxation.
Action 15: Developing a Multilateral Instrument to Modify Bilateral Tax Treaties
This action is intended to improve
coordination of the previous steps.
Overall this is a very impressive achievement in a very
short span of time. While BEPS will not eliminate
double non-taxation any time soon, it demonstrates
significant political commitment by the G20 and
OECD to the single tax principle. It builds on earlier
OECD actions like the commentary on article 1 that
incorporates LOB principles, and that according to
OECD applies to all treaties that include article 1,
which is every tax treaty.
Whatever we think about the efficacy of BEPS (and
I have some doubts in this regard and in regard to the
actual outcomes incorporated in the final package,
which Inevitably reflect political compromises as
well as MNE push-back),24 I think the OECD CTPA
did an amazing job in a very short time frame. BEPS
represents a commitment to the single tax principle
more than anything that has happened since 1927,
and that by itself is a major achievement.

5. The New US Model
Anticipating the outcome of BEPS, the US in May
2015 released several proposed amendments to its
model tax treaty, all of which are consistent with
the single tax principle. These changes were all
incorporated in the US Model released in February
2016.

a. Treaty Exempt PEs
New Article 1 Section 7 excludes from the
withholding tax reductions of the treaty payments
to a permanent establishment of a company of the
treaty partner in a third state ifthe profits of that permanent establishment
are subject to a combined aggregate
effective rate of tax in the [treaty partner
state] and the state in which the permanent
establishment is situated of less than 60
percent of the general rate of company tax
applicable in the [treaty partner state]
or if the PE is situated in a third state that does
not have a tax treaty with the US and the PE is not
subject to tax in the treaty partner.
This provision is intended to prevent treaty benefits
to accruing to a company resident in a treaty party

that applies territoriality so as to exclude the profits
of branches in low-tax jurisdiction. The effect of the
provision would be to impose full 30% withholding
on payments to such branches, consistently with
the single tax principle and with the branch rule of
Subpart F.

b. Expanded LOB
The new LOB article is a significant tightening of
existing LOB rules. For example, the requirement
that if a company is traded on a stock exchange, that
stock exchange must be in the same country that the
company is in, is intended to address “inversion”
transactions in which US companies inverted
to Bermuda, had the board meet in Barbados to
qualify under the US-Barbados treaty, and claimed
exemption from LOB because they were publicly
traded on the NYSE.
In addition, similarly to the 1981 LOB, treaty
benefits are denied to a company unless—
ii) with respect to benefits under this
Convention other than under Article 10
(Dividends), less than 50 percent of the
company’s gross income, and less than 50
percent of the tested group’s gross income,
is paid or accrued, directly or indirectly, in
the form of payments that are deductible
for purposes of the taxes covered by this
Convention in the company’s Contracting
State of residence (but not including arm’s
length payments in the ordinary course of
business for services or tangible property),
either to persons that are not residents
of either Contracting State entitled to
the benefits of this Convention under
subparagraph (a), (b), (c) or (e) of this
paragraph or to persons that meet this
requirement but that benefit from a special
tax regime in their Contracting State of
residence with respect to the deductible
payment. (emphasis added).
“Special tax regime” is a newly defined
term:
l) the term “special tax regime” with respect
to an item of income or profit means any
legislation, regulation or administrative
practice that provides a preferential
effective rate of taxation to such income
or profit, including through reductions in
the tax rate or the tax base. With regard to
interest, the term special tax regime includes
notional deductions that are allowed with
GLOBAL TAXATION | VOL. 1 | MAY 2016 |
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respect to equity. However, the term shall
not include any legislation, regulation or
administrative practice:
i) the application of which does not
disproportionately benefit interest, royalties
or other income, or any combination
thereof;
ii) that, with regard to royalties, satisfies a
substantial activity requirement;
iii) that implements the principles of Article
7 (Business Profits) or Article 9 (Associated
Enterprises);
iv) that applies principally to persons that
exclusively promote religious, charitable,
scientific, artistic, cultural or educational
activities;
v) that applies principally to persons
substantially all of the activity of which is to
provide or administer pension or retirement
benefits;
vi) that facilitates investment in entities that
are marketed primarily to retail investors,
are widely-held, that hold real property
(immovable property), a diversified portfolio
of securities, or any combination thereof,
and that are subject to investor-protection
regulation in the Contracting State in which
the investment entity is established; or
vii) that the Contracting States have agreed
shall not constitute a special tax regime
because it does not result in a low effective
rate of taxation (emphasis added).
This means that the withholding tax reductions of
the treaty will not apply to a company 50% or more
of its income (or of the income of its consolidated
group) is paid in deductible payments either to
residents of third countries or to a company in
the treaty partner country that is subject to a low
effective tax rate because of a “special tax regime.”
As in the 1981 LOB, this provision makes it clear
that the purpose of the LOB is to enforce the single
tax principle, not just to prevent a treaty with the
world.

c. Anti-Inversion Rules
New language is added to articles 10, 11, 12 and 21
to the effect that dividends, interest, royalties and
other income paid by an “expatriated entity” can be
subject to 30% withholding tax for a period of ten
years after the inversion that created it. Since most

18
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“second wave” inversions are to treaty jurisdictions
and the treaty is essential to the purpose of the
inversion, which is to generate double non-taxation
by stripping earnings out of the US into low tax
jurisdictions (e.g., through the Netherlands or
Ireland, as in the infamous double Irish Dutch
sandwich), this will be a significant blow to
inversions when it is included in actual treaties.

d. Special Tax Regimes
The newly defined “special tax regime” will, in
accordance with the Technical Explanation, also
prevent reduction of withholding taxes under
articles 11, 12 and 21.
The Technical Explanation provides that:
Subparagraph 1(l) defines the term “special
tax regime” with respect to an item of
income. The term is used in Articles 11
(Interest), 12 (Royalties), and 21 (Other
Income), each of which denies treaty
benefits to items of income if the resident
of the other Contracting State (the residence
State) beneficially owning the interest,
royalties, or other income, is related to the
payor of such income, and benefits from
a special tax regime in its residence State
with respect to the particular category of
income. This rule allows the Contracting
State in which the item of income arises to
retain its right to tax the income under its
domestic law if the resident benefits from a
regime in the residence State with respect to
a category of income that includes the item
of income that results in low or no taxation.
The term “special tax regime” also is used
in Article 22 (Limitation on Benefits) for
the purposes of the so-called “derivative
benefits” rule in paragraph 4 of that Article.
The application of the term “special
tax regime” in Articles 11, 12 and 21 is
consistent with the tax policy considerations
that are relevant to the decision to enter into
a tax treaty, or to amend an existing tax
treaty, as articulated by the Commentary
to the OECD Model, as amended by
the Base Erosion and Profits Shifting
initiative. In particular, paragraph 15.2 of
the introduction of the OECD Model now
provides:
“Since a main objective of tax treaties is
the avoidance of double taxation in order
to reduce tax obstacles to cross-border
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services, trade and investment, the existence
of risks of double taxation resulting from
the interaction of the tax systems of the two
States involved will be the primary tax policy
concern. Such risks of double taxation will
generally be more important where there is
a significant level of existing or projected
cross-border trade and investment between
two States. Most of the provisions of tax
treaties seek to alleviate double taxation by
allocating taxing rights between two States
and it is assumed that where a State accepts
treaty provisions that restrict its right to tax
elements of income, it generally does so
on the understanding that these elements
of income are taxable in the other State.
Where a State levies no or low income
taxes, other States should consider whether
there are risks of double taxation that
would justify, by themselves, a tax treaty.
States should also consider whether there
are elements of another State’s tax system
that could increase the risk of non-taxation,
which may include tax advantages that are
ring-fenced from the domestic economy.”
The term “special tax regime” means any
legislation, regulation, or administrative
practice that provides a preferential effective
rate of taxation to interest, royalties or
other income, including through reductions
in the tax rate or tax base. In the case of
interest, the term includes any legislation,
regulation, or administrative practice,
whether or not generally available, that
provides notional deductions with respect
to equity. For purposes of this definition,
an administrative practice includes a ruling
practice.
For example, if a taxpayer obtains a ruling
providing that its foreign source interest
income will be subject to a low rate of
taxation in the residence State, and that
rate is lower than the rate that generally
would apply to foreign source interest
income received by residents of that State,
the administrative practice under which the
ruling is obtained is a special tax regime.
Paragraph 2 of the Protocol provides a
list of the legislation, regulations, and
administrative practices existing in the
other Contracting State at the time of
the signature of the Convention that the

Contracting States agree are “special tax
regimes” within the meaning of paragraph
1(l) of Article 3.
This is clearly consistent with the single tax
principle and with the original US LOB of 1981,
which has been eroded in subsequent versions but is
now returning with full force to deny treaty benefits
(reductions in source taxation) in cases that the
effective tax rate at residence is too low.

e. Subsequent Changes
A new article 28 provides that1. If at any time after the signing of this Convention,
the general rate of company tax applicable in
either Contracting State falls below 15 percent
with respect to substantially all of the income
of resident companies, or either Contracting
State provides an exemption from taxation to
resident companies for substantially all foreign
source income (including interest and royalties),
the provisions of Articles 10 (Dividends), 11
(Interest), 12 (Royalties) and 21 (Other Income)
may cease to have effect pursuant to paragraph
4 of this Article for payments to companies
resident in both Contracting States.
2. If at any time after the signing of this
Convention, the highest marginal rate of
individual tax applicable in either Contracting
State falls below 15 percent with respect to
substantially all income of resident individuals,
or either Contracting State provides an
exemption from taxation to resident
individuals for substantially all foreign source
income (including interest and royalties), the
provisions of Articles 10, 11, 12 and 21 may
cease to have effect pursuant to paragraph 4
of this Article for payments to individuals
resident in either Contracting State.
3. For purposes of this Article:
a) the allowance of generally available
deductions based on a percentage of what
otherwise would be taxable income, or other
similar mechanisms to achieve a reduction
in the overall rate of tax, shall be taken
into account for purposes of determining
the general rate of company tax or the
highest marginal rate of individual tax, as
appropriate; and
b) a tax that applies to a company only upon
a distribution by such company, or that
applies to shareholders, shall not be taken
into account in determining the general rate
of company tax.
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4. If the provisions of either paragraph 1 or
paragraph 2 of this Article are satisfied by
changes in law in one of the Contracting
States, the other Contracting State may notify
the first- mentioned Contracting State through
diplomatic channels that it will cease to apply
the provisions of Articles 10, 11, 12 and 21. In
such case, the provisions of such Articles shall
cease to have effect in both Contracting States
with respect to payments to resident individuals
or companies, as appropriate, six months after
the date of such written notification, and the
Contracting States shall consult with a view
to concluding amendments to this Convention
to restore an appropriate allocation of taxing
rights.
The Technical Explanation provides thatThe negotiation of the Convention took into
account the desire of the two Contracting
States to allocate taxing rights between
them in a manner that would alleviate
double taxation that could otherwise result
if cross-border income, profit or gain were
taxed under the domestic laws of the two
Contracting States. The Contracting States
recognize that certain subsequent changes
to the domestic laws of one or both of
the Contracting States that lower taxation
could reduce the risk of double taxation
but in addition increase the risk that the
Convention would give rise to unwanted
instances of low or no taxation. In addition,
such subsequent changes in law could draw
into question the continued appropriateness
of the allocation of taxing rights that was
originally negotiated in the Convention.
Article 28 addresses this possibility
by providing that if, at any time after
the signing of the Convention, either
Contracting State enacts certain changes to
domestic law that could implicate the terms
of the Convention, certain benefits of the
Convention may cease to have effect, and
if so the Contracting States shall consult
with a view to amending the Convention
in a way that would restore an appropriate
allocation of taxing rights.
Article 28 is consistent with the tax policy
considerations that are relevant to the
decision to enter into a tax treaty, or to
amend an existing tax treaty, as articulated
by the Commentary to the OECD Model,
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as amended by the Base Erosion and Profits
Shifting initiative.
Once again the consistency of this provision
with the single tax principle is explicit. The goal
is to address subsequent harmful tax competition
provisions that erode residence- based taxation in
the treaty partner.
Overall these provisions show that in the BEPS
context the US delegation pushed consistently for
the implementation of the single tax principle, while
resisting efforts to upset the existing balance between
residence and source countries by adopting more
radical changes such as formulary apportionment
(although country by country reporting may lead in
this direction; this provision was not favored by the
US).

6. Conclusion
The first model treaty, drafted by the League of
Nations Committee of Technical Experts in 1927,25
explicitly acknowledged the single tax principle in
its commentary. The commentary states:
From the very outset, [the drafters of the
model convention] realized the necessity of
dealing with the questions of tax evasion
and double taxation in co-ordination with
each other. It is highly desirable that States
should come to an agreement with a view to
ensuring that a taxpayer shall not be taxed
on the same income by a number of different
countries, and it seems equally desirable
that such international cooperation should
prevent certain incomes from escaping
taxation altogether. The most elementary and
undisputed principles of fiscal justice, therefore,
required that the experts should devise a scheme
whereby all incomes would be taxed once and
only once.26
This language was implemented, for example, in
the interest article by providing for a provisional
withholding tax that would be refunded upon
showing that the interest was declared in the country
of residence.
We have now come full circle, in that the US, the
OECD and the G20 clearly have adopted the single
tax principle as their goal. The specific measures
in the final BEPS package fall short of this goal,
and the US model treaty provisions have not been
incorporated into any treaty. But there is light at the
end of the tunnel. With further political pressure,
double non-taxation may in fact be on its way to
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extinction, as Secretary General Gurria has said.
The vision of Adams and Surrey (the principal US
architects of the international tax regime) is closer
to fruition now than at any time since the foreign tax
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3.

4.

5.
6.

7.
8.

9.
10.
11.
12.

13.

credit was enacted in 1918. The US should not let
temporary pressures in the opposite direction, like
the current legislative push for a patent box or for
territoriality, stand in the way.

Alexis de Tocqueville, L’Ancien Regime et la Revolution (1856) argued that the major changes of the French Revolution
represent more continuity than change with the Old Regime. See also Jacques Le Goff, Must We Divide History Into
Periods? (2015).
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, International Taxation of Electronic Commerce, 52 Tax L. Rev. 507 (1997).
See, e.g., H. David Rosenbloom, International Tax Arbitrage and the “International Tax System”, 53 Tax L. Rev. 137
(2000); Michael J. Graetz, Taxing International Income - Inadequate Principles, Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory
Policy, 54 Tax Law Review 261 (2001); Julie Roin, Taxation Without Coordination (2002), http://papers.ssrn.com/
paper.taf ?abstract_id=302141; Mitchell A. Kane, STRATEGY AND COOPERATION IN NATIONAL RESPONSES
TO INTERNATIONAL TAX ARBITRAGE, 53 Emory L.J. 89; Adam H. Rosenzweig, HARNESSING THE COSTS
OF INTERNATIONAL TAX ARBITRAGE, 26 Va. Tax Rev. 555. For the contrary position see, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah,
Commentary on Rosenbloom, 53 Tax L. Rev. 167 (2000); Yariv Brauner, An International Tax Regime in Crystallization, 56
Tax L. Rev. 259; Fred B. Brown, An Equity-Based, Multilateral Approach for Sourcing Income Among Nations, 11 Fla. Tax
Rev. 565; Ehab Farah, Mandatory Arbitration of International Tax Disputes: A Solution in Search of a Problem, 9 Fla. Tax
Rev. 703; Victor Thuronyi, INTERNATIONAL TAX COOPERATION AND A MULTILATERAL TREATY, 26 Brooklyn J.
Int’l L. 1641.
Thomas S. Adams, Interstate and International Double Taxation, in Lectures on Taxation 101, 112-13 (Roswell Magill ed.,
1932) (“[t]he state which with a fine regard for the rights of the taxpayer takes pains to relieve double taxation, may fairly
take measures to ensure that the person or property pays at least one tax.”)
See Avi-Yonah, U.S. Notice 98-11 and the Logic of Subpart F: A Comparative Perspective, Tax Notes Int’l (June 8, 1998).
Surrey was largely responsible for the US position rejecting tax sparing, since his testimony against the US-Pakistan treaty
(1957) led to the rejection of that treaty and to a consistent position against tax sparing since then. While this position is
usually justified as a defense of US taxing rights on US source income, the sourcing of income is an uncertain business and
a better argument is that tax sparing is a paradigmatic instance of double non-taxation. Given Surrey’s subsequent actions I
suspect that this is what he had in mind in 1957, but we cannot know for sure until someone investigates the Surrey papers
at Harvard.
The following discussion is based on the excellent historical overview by H. David Rosenbloom. Tax Treaty Abuse: Policies
and Issues, 15 Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus. 763 (1983).
Finland Income Tax Treaty, Mar. 6, 1970, art. XXVII, CCH TAX TREATIES ¶ 2678, P-H TAX TREATIES ¶37,057;
Iceland Income Tax Treaty, May 7, 1975, art. XXVII, CCH TAX TREATIES ¶3730, P-H TAX TREATIES ¶46,127; see
Richard L. Doernberg, Legislative Override of Income Tax Treaties, 42 Tax Law. 173, 188–89 (1989).
United Kingdom Income Tax Treaty, Dec. 31, 1975, art. XVI, CCH TAX TREATIES ¶8103P, P-H TAX TREATIES
¶89,046.
Rosenbloom, 790.
United States Dept. of Treasury Model Income Tax Treaty, June 16, 1981, CCH TAX TREATIES ¶158, P-H TAX
TREATIES ¶1022.
The provision states:
1. A person (other than an individual) which is a resident of a Contracting State shall not be entitled under this Convention
to relief from taxation in the other Contracting State unless
(a) more than 75 percent of the beneficial interest in such person is owned, directly or indirectly, by one or more
individual residents of the first-mentioned Contracting State; and
(b) the income of such person is not used in substantial part, directly or indirectly, to meet liabilities (including
liabilities for interest or royalties) to persons who are residents of a State other than a Contracting State and who
are not citizens of the United States.
For the purposes of subparagraph (a), a company that has substantial trading in its stock on a recognized exchange in
a Contracting State is presumed to be owned by individual residents of that Contracting State.
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply if it is determined that the acquisition or maintenance of such person and the conduct of
its operations did not have as a principal purpose obtaining benefits under the Convention.
3. Any relief from tax provided by a Contracting State to a resident of the other Contracting State under the Convention
shall be inapplicable to the extent that, under the law in force in that other State, the income to which the relief relates
bears significantly lower tax than similar income arising within that other State derived by residents of that other State.
See also IRC section 7701(l) and the regulations thereunder, which override all US treaties to impose a conduit financing
test inspired by Aiken Industries.
GLOBAL TAXATION | VOL. 1 | MAY 2016 |

21

Full Circle? The Single Tax Principle, BEPS, and The New US Model
14. The United States terminated its income tax treaties with Aden and a group of other UK colonies: Aruba, Netherlands
Antilles, Belgian Congo, Honduras, Malawi, and Nicaragua.
15. Rosenbloom, 764-773.
16. Rosenbloom, 774-775.
17. Rosenbloom, 776 (emphasis added).
18. Rosenbloom (2000), supra.
19. For example, the EU Savings Directive (2003) does not apply to interest paid to non-EU persons.
20. Edward Kleinbard, Stateless Income, 11 Fla. Tax Rev. 699 (2011); Edward Kleinbard, The Lessons of Stateless Income, 65
Tax L Rev 99 (2011).
21. Gabriel Zucman, The Hidden Wealth of Nations (2015).
22. Guttentag and Avi-Yonah, Closing the International Tax Gap, in Max B. Sawicky (ed.), Bridging the Tax Gap: Addressing
the Crisis in Federal Tax Administration, 99 (2005).
23. OECD press release, October 5, 2015 (emphasis added).
24. For an alternative to the BEPS approach see Avi-Yonah, Hanging Together (2015), available on SSRN.
25. T.S. Adams was one of the drafters of the first model treaty.
26. Report prepared by the Committee of Experts on Double Taxation and Tax Evasion (League of Nations Publications,1927),
p. 23 (emphasis added).

Please Share News, Views and Grievances
Welcome, Authors
If you would like to share your views on any subject of International Taxation, Transfer
Pricing, BEPS, etc., please send them at hojindal@yahoo.co.in.
Letter to Editor
If you have any suggestion to improve the quality of this Journal or to make it more
informative, please email your suggestions at hojindal@yahoo.co.in.
Query Board
If you have any query on International Taxation or Transfer Pricing, please email it at
hojindal@yahoo.co.in. Our experts will respond with the answer in due course of time.
Grievances
If you have any grievance of a general nature which you like to share with our readers,
please email it at hojindal@yahoo.co.in. We will forward it to the concerned authorities.
We will also publish it in the Journal.

22

| GLOBAL TAXATION | VOL. 1 | MAY 2016

